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THE CRITIQUES  OF THE WAGE  and price control program that have been 
offered  by the Brookings  panel are, compared  with many heard  of late, 
rather  mild. 
From the conceptual  standpoint,  what might  be termed  the theoretical 
criticisms  are of two principal  types.  The first  argues  that large  firms  and 
labor  groups,  because  of their  oligopolistic  power  to determine  prices  and 
wages without regard  to market  conditions,  are the basic source of the 
inflationary  problem.  The aim of the control  program  is, therefore,  wrong 
because  it provides  broad  coverage  instead  of targeting  only on the few 
dominant  economic  units. 
The second  viewpoint  admits  of no inflationary  problem  that cannot  be 
traced  directly  and wholly  to fiscal  and monetary  policies,  and faults  the 
control system  because  it treats only the symptoms  of inflation,  thereby 
diverting  attention  from its underlying  causes.  Accordingly,  the program 
can have no impact  on the rate of inflation;  any slowing  of the price  rise 
that  does  occur  would  have  been  brought  about  anyway  by slack  conditions 
in the economy. 
The Brookings  papers  are representative,  in part at least, of these two 
views.  Although  I concur  with  some  of their  reasoning,  my own position  is 
substantially  different. 
The underlying  causes  of our present  inflationary  situation  were,  I be- 
lieve,  the monetary  and fiscal  policies  of the middle  and late 1960s,  which 
created  a very serious  demand-pull  inflation.  By 1970,  however,  the eco- 
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nomic excesses  and overindulgences  were behind  us. The economy was 
operating  below full employment  in terms  of both the labor market  and 
productive  capacity.  Yet, in 1970  and through  the summer  of 1971,  infla- 
tion continued  apace.  The acceleration  of the price  indexes  was halted,  but 
no significant  progress  was made  in slowing  the rate  of inflation. 
During  that period  the economy  entered  a cost-push  inflation-a spiral 
of rising  wages  and  prices,  based  not on union  or corporate  market  power, 
but on the widely  and deeply  ingrained  expectations  of endless  rapid  infla- 
tion that were being cemented  into the institutional  framework  within 
which  price  and wage  decisions  are made  in our economy. 
Thus  the problem  was not structural;  it was not limited  to merely  a few 
large  firms  or labor  unions  or industries,  but it was  rather  a condition  that 
was pervasive  throughout  the economy.  The price disease  with which we 
had been infected  during  the 1960s  was not being cured by the normal 
market  forces  because  of the widely  diffused  psychological  expectations  of 
workers  and managers  for a continuing  inflationary  spiral. 
The basic problem  of 1971, therefore,  was to subdue  this inflationary 
psychology.  If the economy  had stayed  in a slack condition  long enough, 
no doubt the inflationary  expectations  would have been eliminated.  But 
that  was  not a satisfactory  solution;  the process  was  taking  much  too long. 
Something  had to be done to bridge  this gap, to shorten  the time between 
the emergence  of excess capacity  and the return  of reasonable  wage and 
price  stability.  This  something  was  the economic  stabilization  program  that 
was undertaken  on August  15, 1971. 
Implications  of the Program 
This  view  of the conceptual  basis  of the economic  stabilization  program 
has  a number  of implications.  Without  going  into detail,  and  without  offer- 
ing a forecast  for the future,  I offer  some of them: 
First, the stabilization  program  should be a temporary  one. Once the 
inflationary  expectations  are  eliminated  and  the price-wage  performance  is 
substantially  improved,  the program,  at least in its mandatory  aspects, 
should  end. 
Second,  the program  is not a substitute  for responsible  demand  manage- 
ment  by fiscal  and monetary  policy.  Correspondingly,  the stabilization  ef- 
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doubtful  that  the program  could  suppress  prices  that  were  under  significant 
demand  pressure  for any  length  of time.  In addition,  it is just at that point 
that  the distortions  and  maladjustments  of any mandatory  price  and wage 
control  program  would  begin  to have a damaging  impact. 
Third,  the program  should  aim for a lasting  and durable  diminution  of 
inflation.  Thus it should  not suppress  legitimate  income  claims,  either  on 
the wage  side  or on the  profit  side.  "Legitimate  income  claims"  means  wage 
increases  that  are  on average  equal  to trend  productivity  plus  inflation,  and 
profit  margins  that on average  remain  constant  except  for normal  cyclical 
movements.  If price restraint  takes the form of holding  wage and profit 
gains below their normal  and justifiable  increments,  these claims  will be 
waiting  in the wings  to make  up for lost ground  when  the program  ends,  at 
which  time they would produce  a burst  of price and wage increases  that 
might  well set in motion a new inflationary  spiral. 
Fourth,  because  we are dealing  with a cost-push-expectations  situation, 
the cornerstone  of the program  is the work of the Pay Board.  Essentially 
the program  seeks  a reduction  of the rate  of advance  of wage  rates,  which 
is then translated  into reductions  in the rates of price  increase  without  a 
change  in income  shares  between  labor  and capital  other  than  what  would 
normally  take place in a cyclical  recovery  of the sort we are now having. 
Fifth, the Price  Commission's  primary  function  is to make  sure  that the 
reduction  in wage  inflation  is translated  promptly,  directly,  and appropri- 
ately  into a reduction  in price  inflation.  There  is no need for "cost  absorp- 
tion"  of the  type  Gardner  Ackley  describes  on the  wage  side.  For this  reason 
the general  Price  Commission  policy of cost pass-through  is appropriate. 
A second  function  of the commission  is to weed  out of the economic  struc- 
ture  any  institutional  arrangements  that  have  incorporated  the inflationary 
expectations  of recent  years; for example,  into regulatory  procedures  or 
into long-term  purchase  contracts. 
The arithmetic  of the program,  in a simplified  form,  works  out to some- 
thing  like this: The Pay Board  seeks  to reduce  to around  51/2  percent  the 
annual  rate of wage increases,  which  early  last summer  was about  7 to 8 
percent.  The Price  Commission's  announced  intention  is to reduce  price 
inflation,  which  had  been  running  in the neighborhood  of 4 to 5 percent,  to 
an annual  rate of around  21/2  percent. 
These aims make for a consistent  set of standards:  The standards  are 
consistent  with  the President's  goal of cutting  the rate  of inflation  in half  by 
the end of 1972;  the 5'/2  percent  standard  for wages  is consistent  with  the 202  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1972 
21/2  percent  goal for prices  when  it is coupled  with the 3 percent  trend  in 
economy-wide  productivity;  and both are consistent  with income shares 
that  are  subject  only  to normal  cyclical  change-labor gets  the sum  of trend 
productivity  and price  inflation,  while  capital  gets price  increases  equal  to 
the underlying  rise  in unit labor  costs plus a normal  lifting of profit  mar- 
gins to the extent  that productivity  growth  exceeds  its trend. 
Assessing  the Program 
I believe  we cannot  determine  yet whether  the stabilization  program  has 
been a success.  As the accompanying  table  shows,  on almost  any  measure, 
price  and wage increases  have been slower  in the past seven  months  than 
they  were  in the six months  before  the program  began.  The most dramatic 
comparisons  are those for earnings  in constant  dollars,  which show that 
the average  worker-despite the slower  gain in nominal  wage rates-has 
experienced  a sharp improvement  in the growth of his real purchasing 
power. 
The post-August  figures  are not broken  down between  the freeze  and 
Phase II periods  because  that breakdown  cannot, in my view, be inter- 
preted  accurately.  There  was a significant  bulge  in prices  at the beginning 
of Phase  II, a part  of the  normal  transition  from  the  freeze.  We do not know 
how much  allowance  to make  for that post-freeze  "bubble,"  nor  just how 
long it lasted.  Therefore,  the only  comparison  that  can reasonably  be made 
at this time is between  the pre-August  period  and the post-August  period 
as a whole. 
It is my  belief  that  the  program  has  reduced  both  price  and  wage  inflation 
below what  they would  have been in the absence  of the controls,  but also 
that it is too early  to assess  the ultimate  underlying  impact  of the Phase  II 
program. 
Distortions  Arising  from  the Program 
A major  concern  about any government  attempt  to control  wages and 
prices is its potential for distorting  the economy. Among the possible 
dangers  are  that  the adjustment  processes  of the economy  will be warped  in 
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Table  1. Price  and  Wage  Changes  before  and  during  the Stabilization 
Program  Initiated  in August  1971 
Percent  change, seasonally  adjusted  annual rate 
Six months  prior  During  the 
to the  program:  program: 
February-  August  1971- 
Price or wage  measure  August  1971  March 1972 
Consumer  price index 
All items  4.1  2.8 
Food  5.4  4.9 
Commodities  less food  3.7  1.2 
Servicesa  4.5  3.5 
Renta  3.9  2.8 
Whlolesale  price index 
All commodities  4.6  3.1 
Farm products,  processed  foods and feedsb  2.3  6.7 
Industrial  commodities  5.7  1  .8 
Earnings  of private  nonfarm  production  workers 
Earnings  in current  dollars 
Adjusted  hourlyc  6.8  6.1 
Gross weekly  6.1  7.0 
Spendable  weeklyd  5.4  8.8 
Earnings  in constant dollars 
Adjusted  hourlyc  2.6  3.1 
Gross weekly  1.9  4.1 
Spendable  weeklyd  1.3  5.8 
Sources: U.S.  Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, various issues of The Consumer  Price 
Index, Wh0olesalePrices  anzd  Price Indexes,  and Employment  and Earnings,  supplemented by unpublished  data 
provided by BLS. 
a.  Not seasonally adjusted; data contain almost no seasonal movements. 
b.  Raw agricultural products are exempt from price controls. 
c.  Adjusted for overtime (manufacturing  only) and for interindustry  employment shifts. 
d.  Worker with three dependents. 
of us involved  in the stabilization  effort  have  been  sensitive  to this question 
and have  been  watching  the program  closely  to see what if any difficulties 
might  develop. 
My judgment  is that to date such distortions  and maladjustments  have 
been  neither  pervasive  nor  important.  At the moment  we appear  to be in no 
danger  of upsetting  the basic  efficiency  of the economy.  We have,  however, 
had a number  of examples  of distortions,  all of them rather  isolated,  that 
seem  to have  been  caused  at least  in part  by the program,  and that may  be 
mentioned  here  as a reminder  of the effects  that controls  can have. 
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alterations in business practices in response to the freeze. One instance in- 
volved steel fabricators  who had not adjusted their prices before the freeze 
was instituted on August 15 to  reflect the price hikes made by the steel 
producers  in early August. The normal practice is for the fabricators  to buy 
the steel, process it, and charge the customer a single price covering the 
cost of both the steel and the processing. Because the freeze prevented them 
from raising prices, they started asking their customers to buy the steel that 
was to be processed, and then have it delivered to the fabricator who would 
charge only for the processing. 
Another example comes from the part of the meat industry called "beef 
breaking." This is an intermediate process in meat packing in which the 
carcasses are cut into a small number of relatively large components for 
sale primarily to restaurants and institutions. Ordinarily the components 
are sold separately, but during the freeze the "breakers"  started selling all 
the pieces together as a carcass again until it was ruled illegal under the 
program. They did this because shifts in the relative prices of the individual 
cuts (which were free to decline, but not to rise above their ceilings) made it 
to their advantage to do so. 
A more recent example relates to the people who clean large nonresiden- 
tial buildings. Outside contractors for building maintenance  claim that they 
are at a relative competitive disadvantage vis-'a-vis  a landlord who directly 
hires his own employees to perform this function. If the landlord is able to 
raise wages by more than 5.5 percent  (which is permissible  under  the "catch- 
up" and several other provisions of the program), he may pass the in- 
creased costs through to his tenants in the form of higher rents, since non- 
residential buildings are exempt from the control program. If, however, the 
outside contractor increases wages by more than 5.5 percent, he is pre- 
vented by the Price Commission's rules from passing the added cost through 
in the form of a higher charge for his services. The contractors, therefore, 
are attempting to hold the line on wage increases. But where workers in this 
trade are scarce, there is reported to  be a shift away from outside con- 
tractors to landlords. 
There are also isolated instances of  distortions in areas where strong 
demand-pull inflation exists for some products, even amidst the overall 
slack in the economy today. Cowhide prices, for example, have increased 
very sharply, because Argentina embargoed exports and because of in- 
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situation has developed in lumber. In these cases, vague stories-none  of 
them based on hard facts, apparently-have  been heard of black markets 
and illegal transactions, involving either prices above their ceilings or dete- 
rioration in product quality. We have also heard reports of dummy exports 
and reimports, that is, transactions that occur only on paper: Lumber or 
hides are supposed to have gone to Canada, and then been repurchased 
(and shipped back) at a higher price, while in fact the products never left 
the United States. 
Occasionally the controls program creates anomalies because the foreign 
price has gone up while the domestic price is constrained. One instance con- 
cerns the two-tier pricing system that has developed for zinc sold in this 
country. The world price for zinc is above the permissible domestic price, 
and thus sellers of imported zinc get a higher price than domestic pro- 
ducers (who might prefer to export their production at the higher price but 
evidently do not because of commitments to their domestic zinc customers). 
The situation is aggravated  by the fact that the domestic price of zinc cannot 
rise to ration its use and to draw out the greater  supply that would be forth- 
coming if the market could operate normally. 
In some cases the rules of the stabilization program have a differential 
impact among companies. For example, a multiproduct company may ex- 
perience a rise in material costs for one of its many product lines, but may 
be prevented from increasing the price of that product because of rising 
profit margins on others that bring it up against the profit margin limita- 
tion on its total sales. However, a competing firm that has only a single 
product line and experiences the same rise in  material costs-and  that 
would be permitted to raise its prices for that product-would  be unable to 
do so in face of the competition from the multiproduct firm. In such an 
instance, the profitability  of the single-product  firm would be reduced. Such 
cases have been reported recently in both cotton goods, where the price of 
raw  ;.cotton has skyrocketed because of  reduced crops here in the  past 
couple of years and the failure of the Egyptian crop this year, and in yeast 
manufacturing,  where several raw materials have increased in price. 
Limitations on wage increases have created other examples of a differen- 
tial impact among companies. During the freeze, a company complained 
that its employees were being lured by higher wages to a competitor's plant 
down the road, but that it was prevented  from increasing wages to meet the 
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None of these cases provides  convincing  evidence  of serious  economic 
maladjustments  or distortions.  The evidence  available  to date shows  them 
to be widely  scattered  instances  with no common  pattern  throughout  the 
economy  or even  throughout  any one industry.  Nevertheless,  they do illus- 
trate some of the ancillary  costs of price and wage controls. While at 
present  they do not represent  a widespread  problem,  they are  indicative  of 
what might develop  should the controls  remain  in place for an extended 
period. 